Brian S. Levine
Abstract
Private-sector union certification elections involving multiple unions are significantly more likely to result in union victories than those involving only a single union. I contribute to the literature on union election outcomes by simultaneously investigating different explanations of this phenomenon, including union selection of organizing targets and the effects of inter-union competition on the attractiveness of unionization. An estimable equation measuring the likelihood of multiple-union participation is derived from a simple game-theoretic model of union entry into election campaigns. I specify a corresponding equation measuring the likelihood of unionization, with the occurrence of multiple unionism as a determining factor, for simultaneous estimation by both two-stage least squares and bivariate probit.
The effect of multiple unionism on election outcomes is identified through events posited to
exogenously influence the frequency of multiple unionism. Most significantly, the reaffiliation of
the International Brotherhood of Teamsters with the AFL-CIO in 1987 is posited to reduce the
frequency of multiple-union elections and to only affect election outcomes through the aforementioned reduction. The utilized events are coded via a method analogous to "differences-in-differences-in-differences" into instrumental variables.
I use data from the National Labor Relations Board covering elections held between 1984 and
1990, supplemented with additional union-, industry- and locale-specific information from other
sources, primarily the Merged Outgoing Rotation Group files from the Current Population
Survey.
Evaluated empirical and theoretical evidence suggests that competition induced increases in total
union organizing expenditures substantially increase the probabilities of unionization at multiple-union elections. This result contrasts with the conventional viewpoint held by unionists
and labor relations researchers that multiple unionism induces wasteful duplications of labor
movement organizing expenditures.